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Hicks and Ponce: SB 219 - Autonomous Vehicles

MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC
General Provisions: To Amend Title 40 Chapter 1 Section 1 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Motor Vehicles, so
as to Provide for Definitions; Exempt Persons Operating a fully
autonomous Motor Vehicle with the Automated Driving System
Engaged from the Requirement to Hold a Driver’s License; Provide
for Satisfaction of Requirement to Notify Law Enforcement in
certain Instances of Accidents by fully autonomous Motor
Vehicles; Provide for certain Equipment and Insurance
Requirements for fully autonomous Motor Vehicles; Provide for
Registration Requirements for such Vehicles; Provide for
Exemptions from Seat Belt Requirements; Provide for
Applicability; Provide for Limitations on Adoption of certain Rules
and Regulations; Provide for Related Matters; Repeal Conflicting
Laws; and for Other Purposes
CODE SECTIONS:
BILL NUMBER:
ACT NUMBER:
GEORGIA LAWS:
SUMMARY:

O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-1 (amended),
40-5-21 (amended), 40-6-279 (new),
40-8-11 (new)
SB 219
214
2017 Ga. Laws 549
The Act amends Georgia’s Motor
Vehicles and Traffic Code to create a
legal framework for autonomous
vehicles to operate in Georgia. Persons
responsible
for
operating
fully
autonomous vehicles are exempted
from holding a driver’s license. In the
event of an accident involving an
autonomous vehicle, the vehicle must
remain at the scene and the operator of
the autonomous vehicle must provide
necessary
information
to
law
enforcement.
Minimum
liability
insurance requirements for autonomous
vehicles will be the same as minimum
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coverages required for the taxi and
limousine industry after January 1,
2020. Minimum coverages are set at
250 percent of those coverages until
December 31, 2019. Owners must
register their autonomous vehicles with
the state.
July 1, 2017

History
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are an important emerging
technology with the potential to revolutionize how Americans travel.1
As the technology has evolved, policymakers across the country have
recognized it as a possible paradigm shift for increasing individual
mobility;2 improving public safety and reducing roadway fatalities
caused by human error;3 and sparking new technological
developments that spur economic growth.4 As a result, state
legislatures across the country have worked to bring state laws up to
speed with the new technology and provide a legal framework that
permits automated driving on public roadways.5
Since 2012, at least forty-one states have considered AV-related
legislation, and fifteen states—including Georgia, with the passage of
1. See Olivia Solon, Self-Driving Trucks: What’s the Future for America’s 3.5 Million Truckers?,
GUARDIAN (June 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/17/self-driving-trucksimpact-on-drivers-jobs-us (“Driverless trucks will be safer and cheaper than their human-controlled
counterparts . . . .”); Will Self-Driving Cars Put Cab Drivers, Truckers Out of Business? CBS NEWS
(Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/self-driving-cars-cab-drivers-truckers-out-of-business/
(statement of Uber CEO) (“Self-driving Ubers will be on the road 24 hours a day . . . .”).
2. See, e.g., GEORGIA HOUSE AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY STUDY COMMITTEE, 2014
REPORT, at 8 (Dec. 2014) [hereinafter House Report] (“Not only would the mobility of the elderly and
disabled be increased by AV, other populations could see substantial changes in their community
interaction, health, and job opportunities.”).
3. See David Schaper, Human Errors Drive Growing Death Toll In Auto Crashes, NPR (Oct. 20,
2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/20/498406570/tech-human-errors-drive-growing-death-toll-in-autocrashes. In 2015, more than 35,000 people died in automobile accidents in the United States, and the
rate of driver fatalities is continuing to increase. Id. Critically, “[n]inety-four percent of crashes can be
tied back to a human choice or error.” Id.
4. See House Report, supra note 2, at 2–4; see also AV: Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 29, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enactedlegislation.aspx [hereinafter Self-Driving Legislation].
5. See Self-Driving Legislation, supra note 4.
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Senate Bill (SB) 219—have passed such legislation.6 AV technology
has also caught the attention of policymakers at the federal level.7 In
2016, the National Highway and Transportation Safety
Administration (NHTSA) updated its policy language on AVs and
issued updated guidance for the safe development of the technology.8
The new NHTSA guidance makes clear that “states retain their
traditional responsibilities for vehicle licensing and registration,
traffic laws and enforcement,” underscoring the critical role state
legislatures play in promoting—or restricting—the development of
AV technology.9
Yet not all states have embraced AV technology with equal
enthusiasm.10 Concerns about privacy, cyber security, proper chains
of liability, and the ethics of driverless technology (which must be
programmed to make life-or-death decisions) have caused some
policymakers to give the industry a yellow light before it brings fleets
of fully autonomous vehicles to public roadways.11 For these reasons,
states like California stopped short of allowing full proliferation of
AV technology, opting instead to limit the industry to only
government-regulated testing until the law changes.12 Specifically,
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Id. The policy provides a set of fifteen best practices regarding the safe design, development, and
deployment of AV technology on public roads. Id. Those fifteen best practices emphasize technology
that can be designed to support the following: data sharing, privacy, system safety, digital security,
human-machine interfacing, crashworthiness, consumer education, certification, post-crash behavior,
laws and practices, ethical considerations, operational design, detection and response, fallback, and
validation. Cecilia Kang, The Fifteen-Point Federal Checklist for Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/technology/the-15-point-federal-checklist-for-selfdriving-cars.html.
9. Self-Driving Legislation, supra note 4.
10. See id. Nevada passed the nation’s first AV legislation in 2011. Id. Since then, twenty states and
Washington D.C. passed AV legislation, including Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Vermont. Id. Additionally,
governors in Arizona, Massachusetts, Washington and Wisconsin have issued executive orders related
to AV technology. Id.
11. Telephone Interview with Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th) (Mar. 27, 2017) (on file with Georgia State
University Law Review) [hereinafter Setzler Interview] (noting that legislation from various states can
either promote or restrict free proliferation of AV technology); House Report, supra note 2, at 6; see
also, e.g., Zeninjor Enwemeka, Five Key Issues Massachusetts Lawmakers Are Considering on SelfDriving Cars, WBUR (June 6, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2017/06/06/self-driving-carbills-massachusetts.
12. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (describing California’s regulatory scheme that imposes data
submission requirements on AV testing).
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California’s AV legislation requires special permits for AV
technology, limits AV testing to certain prescribed locations, and
imposes a number of regulatory and data submission requirements on
developers.13 Critics argue such bills are largely “symbolic,” and
although they purport to broadly encourage testing, their tight
regulatory restrictions put a “straight jacket” on AV technology.14
Even some California lawmakers fear their AV regulations might
chill innovation and send an anti-technology message to the
industry.15 Such fears might be well founded; Uber recently shipped
its San Francisco-based fleet of driverless Volvos to Arizona, a state
that does not require the special permits required in California.16
Other states, meanwhile, passed incomplete legislation that
requires lawmakers to revisit existing bills in order to keep pace with
the industry as it evolves over time. Florida, for example, passed
legislation in 2012 that required the presence of a driver in all AVs at
all times.17 Florida lawmakers later revisited the legislation in 2016
to remove that requirement and make the law consistent with the
purpose of driverless technology—that is, eliminating the need for a
human driver in the vehicle.18
Still other states have passed legislation that grants greater
freedom for testing, but creates significant barriers to market entry
that may ultimately limit private proliferation of AV technology.19
Michigan’s AV laws, for example, include provisions that some
contend heavily favor traditional automobile manufacturers at the
expense of new players.20 One such provision permits testing only for
13. Id.; see also Russ Mitchell, California Regulations for Driverless Cars Stall as Other States
Speed Ahead, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017, 12:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hydriverless-regulations-california-20170126-story.html; Self-Driving Legislation, supra note 4.
14. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (expressing his concerns about overly restrictive regulatory
schemes making it difficult to proliferate AV technology); see also Mitchell, supra note 13.
15. Mitchell, supra note 13 (reporting that Silicon Valley state senator Jerry Hill worries California
could be perceived “as anti-innovation, slow and behind the times”).
16. Id. (“The robot cars required state permits to operate in California, but Uber refused to apply.
Officials ordered them off public roadways in late December. So Uber shipped the cars to a state where
such permits aren’t required.”).
17. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (describing the original Florida bill as a “non-law” because it
still required a driver to be present in the driverless vehicle); Self-Driving Legislation, supra note 4.
18. See Self-Driving Legislation, supra note 4.
19. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (explaining how the Michigan AV bill raised concerns for nontraditional auto manufacturing companies).
20. Greg Gardner, Google Wants to Amend Michigan Autonomous Vehicle Bills, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (Sept. 13, 2016, 6:21 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/2016/09/13/google-wants-
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companies which previously distributed motor vehicles in Michigan;
another provision requires AVs operating in Michigan to be
“supplied or controlled by a motor vehicle manufacturer.”21
According to critics, these requirements could be used to exclude
technology companies that modify vehicles they did not
manufacture.22
Against this backdrop, Georgia legislators saw an opportunity to
craft a different type of bill that promotes full proliferation of AVs
without requiring significant future deregulation to make the
technology commercially viable.23
Recognizing that advancements in AV technology could reduce
roadway fatalities and bring new businesses to Georgia, in 2014 the
Georgia House of Representatives passed House Resolution 1265 to
create the House Autonomous Vehicle Technology Study
Committee.24 Chaired by Representative Trey Kelley (R-16th), the
committee heard testimony in three public hearings from “experts,
researchers, auto industry representatives, and legal advisors” to
address the variety of policy issues related to AVs, including public
safety, infrastructure, the economy, and civil liability.25
The Committee identified unique challenges presented by AVs,
including new cybersecurity threats and potential hacking,
unpredictable interactions between humans and driverless vehicles,
the loss of driver-related jobs, and infrastructure changes necessary to
accommodate driverless technology.26 On the other hand, the
Committee noted Georgians would enjoy a number of meaningful
benefits from driverless technology, including reduced auto accidents
from human error, more efficient traffic flow, and increased
economic investment.27

amend-michigan-autonomous-vehicle-bills/90326284/.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (explaining how Georgia’s SB 219 was the first bill to
deliberately bring all stakeholders together to craft a “consensus bill” that could be used as a national
template going forward); Telephone Interview with Rep. Trey Kelley (R-16th) at 20 min., 3 sec. (Apr. 7,
2017) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review) [hereinafter Kelley Interview].
24. House Report, supra note 2, at 2.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 6–10.
27. Id. at 3, 5.
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For these reasons, Committee testimony largely emphasized the
benefits of AV technology over the risks and cautioned against
rushed legislation that might “shock the market and cause delay in
this exciting technology.”28 Georgia State University College of Law
Professor Yaniv Heled recommended to the Committee that Georgia
should create its own laws instead of duplicating what other states
had already done.29 The Committee agreed and concluded that a bad
bill would be worse than no bill at all, and Georgia should “allow the
market to further mature and grow without government
intervention.”30 The Committee ultimately recommended that
Georgia legislators carefully craft legislation that would “best
promote the development of this technology in Georgia” by
“provid[ing] a pro-business climate with low taxes and minimal
regulation.”31
By the 2017 session, Georgia lawmakers had been approached by
a large auto manufacturer promoting a bill similar to the AV
legislation passed in Michigan.32 As in Michigan, this proposed bill
was opposed by technology and ride-share companies including
Google and Uber, who saw the Michigan-style bill as
disproportionately favoring traditional auto manufacturers.33 Instead,
Google and Uber hoped for a bill that would accommodate broader
proliferation of AV technology by providing a more level playing
field to both traditional and non-traditional manufacturers.34
Georgia lawmakers heeded the lessons from the 2014 study and
from the impact of legislation in other states. In 2017, they decided to
28. Id. at 11.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (explaining that in 2014, Georgia concluded a multi-year study
on AV technology and determined that “a bad bill is worse than no bill at all,” and that, as a result,
Georgia lawmakers concluded it was better to hold off at the time); House Report, supra note 2, at 11.
31. House Report, supra note 2, at 11.
32. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (explaining that a large automobile manufacturer came to
Georgia proposing a manufacturer-centric bill that had high barriers to entry, such as a $10M capital
requirement, and kept the industry locked into testing without private proliferation); Kelley Interview,
supra note 23, at 2 min., 24 sec. (explaining that the new House bill had been initially modeled after the
Michigan bill, before lawmakers changed course and decided to develop a bill that would bring together
all stakeholders).
33. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (explaining that Google, Uber, and others opposed the
Michigan-modeled bill because they wanted a bill that did not favor traditional auto manufacturers); see
also Gardner, supra note 20.
34. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (explaining that Google, Uber, and others wanted a bill more
accommodating to non-traditional auto companies); see also Gardner, supra note 20.
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reject the manufacturer-centric Michigan approach that they saw as
“tilti[ng] the scale[s]” in favor of some manufacturers over others.35
Lawmakers also hoped to avoid California’s stringent regulatory
scheme, which they considered overly restrictive and stifling to
innovation.36
Instead, Georgia sought to develop “a consensus bill” that would
bring together all stakeholders to craft legislation that could serve as
a national model for AV bills across the country.37 The major auto
manufacturers saw the opportunity in Georgia’s approach and
ultimately joined the coalition of stakeholders that included
traditional auto manufacturers, technology companies, ride-share
companies, engineers, trial attorneys, and insurance companies.38
This allowed Georgia lawmakers to craft a bill that immediately
facilitates full proliferation of AV technology without locking the
industry into a testing-only phase, while protecting public safety
through an appropriate chain of responsibility.39
Bill Tracking
In large part, Georgia’s bill truly is homegrown law.40 After many
hours of conference calls between lawmakers and other stakeholders,
Representative Trey Kelley (R-16th) introduced House Bill (HB) 248
on February 2, 2017, officially putting Georgia’s AV legislation in
motion.41 Senator Steve Gooch (R-51st) subsequently introduced SB
219, the Senate version of the bill, on February 22, 2017, which
House representatives agreed had a clearer path to passage in the

35. Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 2 min., 24 sec. (explaining that historically there can be
divisions between auto manufacturers, tech companies, and ride-share companies, and that Georgia
lawmakers did not want to “tilt the scale[s]” in favor of any one industry).
36. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (expressing his concerns with the California bill’s overly
bureaucratic regulatory scheme that requires government authorization, data submission, and so on).
37. Setzler Interview, supra note 11; Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 15 min., 18 sec.
38. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (explaining that after Georgia said no to the auto industrycentric proposed bill in 2017, the auto manufacturers understood this and joined the coalition that
Georgia built with other stakeholders).
39. Id. (explaining that Georgia wants to avoid giving a red light to the development of AV
technology, so long as the legal framework provides adequate safeguards).
40. Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 11 min., 42 sec. (emphasizing the “Georgia-grown” nature of
SB 219).
41. State of Georgia Final Composite Sheet, HB 248, May. 11, 2017.
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current session.42 SB 219 passed the Senate without opposition on
March 3, 2017,43 and was subsequently approved in the House on
March 24, 2017, by a vote of 151 to 17.44
Although the bill passed the Senate without opposition, SB 219
saw minor opposition in the House.45 Among the seventeen
representatives who voted against the bill, the primary concern of one
vocal opponent focused on cybersecurity and the threat of potential
hacking.46 Such concerns echoed the risks identified in the House
Committee’s 2014 study. In its report, the Committee identified
“privacy, cyber security, and radio frequency concerns” among the
top policy issues implicated by driverless technology.47 However,
proponents argue that all new technology comes with safety concerns
and that today’s roadways are already “inherently unsafe” in ways
that could be improved through AVs.48 “When was the horseless
carriage safe enough?” wondered Representative Ed Setzler (R-35th),
a member of the 2014 House Study Committee and sponsor of the
House’s predecessor to SB 219.49 “Georgia wants to avoid giving a
red light to the development of this technology. Give it a green light,
as long as public safety is protected through appropriate chain of
responsibility.”50

42. State of Georgia Final Composite Sheet, SB 219, May, 11, 2017; see also Kelley Interview,
supra note 23, at 6 min., 41 sec. (explaining that after Rep. Kelley introduced HB 248, it became clear
that the House version could not realistically get through the House in time).
43. State of Georgia Final Composite Sheet, SB 219, May, 11, 2017; Georgia Senate Voting Record,
SB 219, Vote #148 (Mar. 3, 2017).
44. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 219, Vote #306 (Mar. 24, 2017).
45. See id.; Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 17 min., 15 sec. (explaining that SB 219 faced minor
resistance in the House even while leadership remained comfortable with the bill).
46. See, e.g., Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 18 min., 15 sec. (explaining that one of Sen.
Kelley’s colleagues in particular simply could not get comfortable with the technology).
47. House Report, supra note 2, at 6.
48. See Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 18 min., 15 sec. (recognizing that there is always
resistance to new technologies); see also House Report, supra note 2, at 5 (“[W]ith any new disruptive
technology new complications and liabilities would certaintly arise.”).
49. Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (expressing that SB 219 is meant to avoid the restrictive
regulatory burdens that other states impose on autonomy vehicles technology).
50. Id.
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Consideration and Passage by the Senate
Senator Gooch sponsored SB 219 in the Senate.51 The Senate first
read SB 219 on February 22, 2017.52 SB 219 was assigned to the
Senate Committee on Transportation, which made a number of
amendments to the bill.53
The Senate Committee significantly altered the substance and
length of the bill. The Committee reduced the original version’s
twenty-two sections down to only four sections. It removed such
substantive requirements as mandatory data collection, preauthorization of testing, pre-authorization of testing sites limited to
prescribed geographical areas, and annual reporting requirements.54
The Senate Committee on Transportation favorably reported the
bill by substitute on February 28, 2017.55 The Senate read the bill for
the second time on March 1, 2017, and for the third time on March 3,
2017.56 Senators Gooch and Butch Miller (R-49th) offered a floor
amendment to modify the definition of “operator” to include one
“who causes an automated motor vehicle to move or travel with an
automated driving system engaged.”57 No additional floor
amendments were introduced. On March 3, 2017, the Senate adopted
the floor amendment and passed the Committee substitute of SB 219,
as amended, by a vote of 51 to 0.58
Consideration and Passage by the House
Representative Kelley sponsored SB 219 in the House.59 The
House read the bill for the first time on March 6, 2017, and

51. Georgia General Assembly, SB 219, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/enUS/Display/20172018/SB/219. Senators Brandon Beach (R-21st), Jeff Mullis (R-53rd), Tyler Harper
(R-7th), and Ben Watson (R-1st) cosponsored the bill. Id.
52. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 219, May 11, 2017.
53. Id.
54. Compare SB 219 (SCS), 2017 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with SB 219, as introduced, 2017 Ga. Gen.
Assemb.
55. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 219, May 11, 2017.
56. Id.
57. SB 219 (SCSFA), 2017 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
58. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 219, Vote #148 (Mar. 3, 2017).
59. Georgia General Assembly, SB 219, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/enUS/Display/20172018/SB/219.
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committed the bill to the House Committee on Transportation.60 The
House read the bill a second time on March 9, 2017.61 On March 16,
2017, the House Committee favorably reported the bill by
substitute.62
The House Committee substitute contained a separate definition
for “dynamic driving task” that lists the operational and tactical
functions necessary for an “automated driving system,” including
lateral motion and steering, longitudinal acceleration and
deceleration, and environmental response.63 The Committee also
made a substantive change to the minimum liability insurance
requirements, which had formerly been set at the same levels
required for the taxi and limousine industry, by adding a provision
that requires 250 percent of those taxi and limousine coverages until
December 31, 2019.64
The House read the bill for the third time on March 24, 2017, and
passed the Committee substitute on the same day by a vote of 151 to
17.65
The Senate agreed to the House’s amended version of the bill on
March 27, 2017, by a vote of 53 to 0.66 The Senate sent the bill to
Governor Nathan Deal (R) on April 7, 2017. The Governor signed
the bill into law on May 8, 2017, and the bill became effective on
July 1, 2017.67
The Act
The Act amends the following portions of Georgia’s code: Article
1 of Chapter 1 of Title 40, relating to motor vehicle definitions; and
Article 2 of Chapter 5 of Title 40, relating to exemptions to the
requirement for a drivers license.68 The Act also adds two new Code
60. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 219, May 11, 2017.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Compare SB 219 (HCS), § 1, p. 1, ll. 15–28, 2017 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with SB 219 (SCSFA), pp.
1–2, ll. 14–29, 2017 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
64. SB 219 (HCS), § 3, p. 4, ll. 120–31, 2017 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
65. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 219, May 11, 2017; Georgia House of
Representatives Voting Record, SB 219, Vote #306 (Mar. 24, 2017).
66. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 219, May 11, 2017.
67. O.C.G.A. § 1-3-4 (2017).
68. 2017 Ga. Laws 549, §§ 1–2, at 550–52.
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sections: Article 12 of Chapter 6 of Title 40, relating to motor vehicle
accidents; and Article 1 of Chapter 8 of Title 40, relating to AV
insurance liability.69 Altogether, the Act sets up a basic framework
for AV operation on Georgia roadways,70 with the ultimate goal of
increasing road safety71 and creating a flexible framework that would
encourage the growth of the AV industry,72 while also
acknowledging that AV technology may require an adjustment
period.73
Section 1
Section 1 of the Act amends Code section 40-1-1, which provides
a list of definitions relating to motor vehicles as used within Title
40.74 The Act revises paragraphs (15.2), (15.3), (17.2), and (38),
while adding new definitions in paragraphs (5.1), (15.4), (17.3),
(27.1), and (37.1).75 The definitions are purposefully “tight” to ensure
that any AV operating in Georgia fully complies with all of the rules
of the road.76
Several of the changes are straightforward and maintain existing
language by simply shifting paragraphs to accommodate the new
definitions.77 Additionally, the Act adopts language similar to that
69. 2017 Ga. Laws 549, § 3, at 552.
70. Video Recording of House Transportation Subcommittee Meeting at 1 hr., 21 min., 22 sec. (Mar.
9, 2017) (remarks by Sen. Steve Gooch (R-51st)),
https://livestream.com/accounts/19771738/events/6811894/videos/151342386 [hereinafter
Transportation Subcommittee Video] (stating that the “bill sets up a basic framework for AV to operate
on our roads in Georgia”).
71. See Video Recording of House Floor Session at 1 hr., 41 min., 7 sec. (Mar. 24, 2017) (remarks
by Rep. Trey Kelley (R-16th)), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8FBZ9oath7o [hereinafter House
Floor Video] (prefacing his discussion of road safety statistics by stating, “This measure, more than
anything, is about safety.”).
72. House Report, supra note 2, at 7.
73. See Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 6 min., 7 sec. (discussing the importance of the increased
insurance coverage minimums during the early years when the technology is not yet perfected).
74. 2017 Ga. Laws 549. § 1, at 550–51.
75. Id.
76. House Floor Video, supra note 71, at 1 hr., 41 min., 7 sec. (remarks by Rep. Trey Kelley (R16th)) (“[W]hat this bill does is put some tight definitions into what an automated driving system is and
makes clear that, should they be able to be on Georgia roads, that they must continue to comply with all
of the rules of our roads here . . . .”).
77. See 2017 Ga. Laws 549, § 1, at 550–51 (shifting paragraph (15.2), “Electric assisted bicycle,” to
paragraph (15.3); paragraph (15.3), “Electric personal assisted mobility device,” to paragraph (15.4);
and paragraph (17.2), “Golf car,” to paragraph (17.3)).
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adopted by the NHSTA from the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) International Standard Defining AV.78 This includes
paragraph (5.1), defining “automated driving system,”79 paragraph
(37.1), defining “operational design domain,”80 and paragraph (15.2),
defining “dynamic driving task.”81 After discussions with engineers
and industry experts, the legislature crafted the Act’s remaining
definitions, drawing inspiration from, but not fully integrating, the
SAE definitions.82 “[A]t the end of the day,” many of the critical
definitions reflect the legislature’s intent to create “Georgia-grown”
legislation that consolidated the divided interests of traditional auto
manufacturers, technology companies, and ride-share companies.83
Of particular importance is the Act’s revision to paragraph (38),
which defines an “[o]perator” as “any person . . . who causes a fully
autonomous vehicle to move or travel with the automated driving
system.”84 “Person” retains its ordinary meaning as either a natural
person or an entity,85 while the “who” refers specifically to the
78. See Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 11 min., 42 sec. (“We’ve looked at what’s called a
[“SAE”] definitions which [NHTSA] has used for guidance. [So], we really tried to copy a lot of those
[SAE] definitions . . . .”); Press Release, SAE Int’l, NHTSA Adopts SAE International Standard
Defining AV (Oct. 3, 2016), www.sae.org/news/3550/ [hereinafter SAE Press Release].
79. Compare O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(5.1) (Supp. 2017) with SAE INT’L, J3016 SURFACE VEHICLE
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE: TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO DRIVING
AUTOMATION
SYSTEMS
FOR
ON-ROAD
MOTOR
VEHICLES
§ 3.2
(Sept.
2016),
http://standards.sae.org/j3016_201609/ [hereinafter J3016].
80. Compare O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(37.1) (Supp. 2017) with NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
COMM’N,
FEDERAL
AUTOMATED
VEHICLES
POLICY
85
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.transportation.gov/AV/federal-automated-vehicles-policy-september-2016
[hereinafter
NHSTA Policy].
81. Compare O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(15.2) (Supp. 2017) with J3016, supra note 79, § 3.8.
82. See Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 11 min., 42 sec. (“[W]e’ve probably had seven, eight
hours worth of conference calls with engineers [] and experts in the field . . . . [W]e also really worked
just to craft language ourselves based on conversations and research we had with experts and
engineers.”); J3016, supra note 79, § 5.6 (defining level 5 “full driving automation”); NHSTA Policy,
supra note 80 (defining “minimal risk condition”).
83. See Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 11 min., 42 sec. (“[A]t the end of the day, [this is a]
Georgia-grown bill. So much of this is language that we’ve created ourselves.”); id. at 6 min., 7 sec.
(“[W]e got everybody in the room . . . . [W]e got Google, we got Apple, we got Uber, we got [General
Motors], we got Ford . . . .”); Electronic Mail Interview with Rep. Ed Setzler (R–35th) (Nov. 3, 2017)
(on file with Georgia State University Law Review) (explaining that Georgia legislators consulted
leading legal experts with many of these interested parties) [hereinafter Setzler Email Interview]. “[T]his
working group was working on a solution that could not only serve Georgia well for decades to come,
but that could potentially be used in forty-nine other states nationwide.” Setzler Email Interview, supra.
84. 2017 Ga. Laws 549, § 1, at 551; Transportation Subcommittee Video, supra note 70, at 1 hr., 34
min., 16 sec. (remarks by Rep. Clay Cox (R-108th)).
85. Transportation Subcommittee Video, supra note 70, at 1 hr., 37 min., 27 sec. (remarks by Rep.
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“entity that furnishes . . . the vehicle and makes it available.”86 The
added clause aims to limit liability to single-point accountability,
whether responsibility lies with an auto manufacturer that directly
sells and manufacturers the vehicle, a tech company that buys a
vehicle and installs an automated driving system, a taxi company that
buys or leases an automated vehicle, or an individual owner.87
Industry players were willing to embrace liability to promote industry
growth.88
Section 2
Section 2 of the Act amends Code section 40-5-21, which relates
to persons exempt from having a driver’s license.89 Specifically, the
Act amends subsection (a), adding paragraph (13) and making minor
grammatical revisions to paragraphs (11) and (12).90
The Act creates an additional exemption to the Uniform
Commercial Driver’s License Act, whereby neither the “fully
autonomous vehicle with the automated driving system engaged” nor
its “operator” require a driver’s license.91 In other words, an
individual does not need a driver’s license to ride in a fully
autonomous vehicle.92 This amendment increases the mobility of
individuals—such as the elderly, the disabled, or even minors—who,
without the help of others, are generally immobile because they lack
the ability to drive.93
Ed Setzler (R-35th)).
86. Id.
87. See Transportation Subcommittee Video, supra note 70, at 1 hr., 39 min., 22 sec. (remarks by
Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)).
88. Id. at 1 hr., 39 min., 38 sec. (remarks by Rep. Kevin Tanner (R-9th)).
89. 2017 Ga. Laws 549, § 2, at 551–52.
90. Id. at 551–52. (removing the word “and” from the end paragraph of (11) and shifting it to
paragraph (12), consistent with the addition of paragraph (13)).
91. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-21 (Supp. 2017).
92. Transportation Subcommittee Video, supra note 70, at 1 hr., 21 min., 22 sec. (remarks by Sen.
Steve Gooch (R-51st)) (“[T]he day may come where our children and grandchildren will no longer need
a driver’s license in Georgia . . . . Well you wouldn’t have to be a licensed driver to ride in [an]
autonomous vehicle.”).
93. See House Floor Video, supra note 71, at 1 hr., 41 min., 7 sec. (remarks by Rep. Trey Kelley (R16th)) (reciting the story of the legally blind man who accomplishes his daily errands with the assistance
of a fully autonomous vehicle); House Report, supra note 2, at 8 (“Not only would the mobility of the
elderly and disabled be increased by AV, other populations could see substantial changes in their
community interaction, health, and job opportunities.”).
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Section 3
Section 3 of the Act adds Code sections 40-6-279 and 40-8-11,
relating to accidents and AV insurance liability, respectively.94
Code Section 40-6-279
The Act adds Code section 40-6-279, which states that, in the
event of an accident with the automated driving system engaged, a
fully autonomous vehicle satisfies the various post-accident statutory
duties imposed on the vehicle’s driver if the vehicle remains at the
scene of the accident and the vehicle or its operator promptly
contacts law enforcement.95
Code Section 40-8-11
The Act adds Code section 40-8-11, which includes both the
requirements for operating a fully autonomous vehicle without a
human driver present and the motor vehicle liability coverage
requirements to do so.96 Operation of a fully autonomous vehicle
requires the vehicle’s complete compliance with all of the “[r]ules of
the [r]oad.”97 The crux of this section, however, is the updated
insurance requirement, where the legislature consulted both trial
lawyers and the insurance industry.98 The Act adds a “sunset”
provision, which for the first three years, until December 31, 2019,
mandates that motor vehicle liability coverage must be 250 percent of
the statutorily required minimum, equivalent to $750,000 for vehicles
containing twelve or fewer passengers.99 After three years, the
94. 2017 Ga. Laws 549, § 3, at 552–53.
95. Id. at 552 (“. . . the requirements of subsection (a) of Code Sections 40-6-270, 40-6-271,
40-6-273, 40-6-273, and 40-6-273.1 shall be deemed satisfied . . .”).
96. Id. at 552–53.
97. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11(a)(1) (Supp. 2017) (requiring a fully autonomous vehicle to be “capable of
being operated in compliance with Chapter 6 of this title [Uniform Rules of the Road]”).
98. See Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 6 min., 7 sec. (“[W]e got insurance companies in the
room, we got the trial lawyers in the room . . . . [T]hat was a key point[,] . . . making sure we had the
correct insurance requirements in place should [an] accident occur.”).
99. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11(a)(4) (Supp. 2017); O.C.G.A. § 40-1-166(1) (2015) ($300,000 minimum for
capacity of 12 passengers or less); Transportation Subcommittee Video, supra note 70, at 1 hr., 40 min.,
42 sec. (remarks by Rep. Trey Kelley (R-16th)) ( referring to the higher initial minimum insurance
coverage requirement as a “sunset”).
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coverage requirement returns to the $300,000 minimum generally
required for limousines and taxis.100 The initial increase reflects the
legislature’s belief that litigation involving a brand new, developing
technology will be extremely costly, and the appropriate level of
insurance coverage must be available to promote safety and help
cover that cost.101
Analysis
Georgia’s Autonomous Vehicle Legislation: Thorough or Too
Complex?
Nevada, California, Florida, and Michigan were the first states to
pass AV legislation.102 Unlike Georgia, all of these states passed
legislation before the NHTSA adopted the SAE’s standard
definitions.103 Thus, these states had less guidance, and this lack of
guidance is reflected in the less-technical language of their
definitions.104 Additionally, there is no indication that these states,
like Georgia, consulted engineers and industry experts while crafting
their statutory language.105
100. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11(a)(4)(B)(i) (Supp. 2017); O.C.G.A. § 40-1-166(1) (2015); Transportation
Subcommittee Video, supra note 70, at 1 hr., 21 min., 22 sec. (remarks by Sen. Steve Gooch (R-51st))
(stating that the Act adopts the insurance coverage and minimums language that applies to limousines
and taxis).
101. See Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 6 min., 7 sec. (“I felt especially in these early years trying
to litigate this issue from a products scenario could be very extensive and very expensive and we need
the checks and balances of our civil justice system in my opinion to help perfect this technology . . . . I
wanted to make sure that there would be insurance coverage available to help cover [an accident].”);
House Report, supra note 2, at 7 (“[M]aking sure that public safety is a priority by requiring appropriate
insurance coverage for manufacturers . . . will be essential.”).
102. See House Report, supra note 2, at 7. As of the House Autonomous Vehicle Technology Study
Committee’s 2014 Report, only these four states and the District of Columbia had passed AV
legislation. Id.
103. See SAE Press Release, supra note 78 (NHTSA adopted SAE’s J3016 standard in 2016); SelfDriving Legislation, supra note 4 (Nevada bill enacted in June 2011, California in September 2012,
Florida in April 2012, and Michigan in December 2013).
104. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.003(2) (LexisNexis 2017) (defining AV, in part, as “[a]ny
vehicle equipped with autonomous technology. The term ‘autonomous technology’ means technology
installed on a motor vehicle that has the capability to drive the vehicle on which the technology is
installed without the active control or monitoring by a human operator.”); NEV. ADMIN. CODE
§ 482A.010 (2012) (interpreting “autonomous vehicle” as a vehicle “enabled with artificial intelligence
and technology that allows the vehicle to carry out all the mechanical operations of driving without the
active control or continuous monitoring of a natural person.”).
105. See Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 11 min., 42 sec. (noting lengthy conference calls
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While a lay person may understand less complex language,
legislatures intend these statutes to provide guidance to the AV
industry to ensure that AVs on the roads are safe.106 This means that,
optimally, statutory definitions should provide as much clarity as
possible to the AV industry. Multiple lengthy definitions create
complexity, but sophisticated parties have the resources to sift
through this language to determine exactly what is required of
them,107 rather than dealing with the inherent uncertainties created
when simple language defines complex technology.108 Accordingly,
Nevada, the first state to adopt AV legislation,109 passed A.B. 69
during the 2017 legislative session, amending its AV statutes to
include many of the same NHSTA standard definitions adopted
within the Act.110
Potential Safety Oversights
The legislature stressed that the Act’s purpose is to promote
safety.111 However, compared to several other states, the Act lacks a
provision explicitly requiring the vehicle to alert the operator if, for
example, “an autonomous technology failure is detected while the
autonomous vehicle technology is engaged.”112 Although on its face
discussing language with engineers and industry experts).
106. See, e.g., House Floor Video, supra note 71, at 1 hr., 41 min., 7 sec. (remarks by Rep. Trey
Kelley (R-16th)).
107. See Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 6 min., 7 sec. (interested parties include Google, Apple,
Uber, General Motors, and Ford).
108. Compare CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(a)(1) (Deering 2012) (defining “[a]utonomous technology”
as “technology that has the capability to drive a vehicle without the active physical control or
monitoring by a human operator”) with O.C.G.A. 40-1-1(5.1), (15.2) (Supp. 2017) (defining “automated
driving system” and further providing a detailed definition of a term within that definition, “dynamic
driving task”).
109. Self-Driving Legislation, supra note 4.
110. 2017 Nev. Stat. Ch. 608, §§ 2.3, 2.5, 2.7, 3, 4 (defining “[d]ynamic driving task,” “[f]ully
autonomous vehicle,” “[m]inimal risk condition,” “[o]perational design domain,” and “SAE J3016”).
111. See House Floor Video, supra note 71, at 1 hr., 41 min., 7 sec. (remarks by Rep. Trey Kelley (R16th)); Transportation Subcommittee Video, supra note 70, at 1 hr., 41 min., 50 sec. (remarks by Rep.
Kevin Tanner (R-9th)) (“[O]ur goal here is to protect public safety.”).
112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.145(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2016); see also, e.g., 2017 Nev. Stat. Ch. 608, § 9
(amending NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.080(3) (“Equipped with a means to alert the human operator to
take manual control of the AV if a failure of the automated driving system occurs . . .”); CAL. VEH.
CODE § 38750(c)(1)(C) (Deering 2012) (requiring pre-operation certification that “[t]he autonomous
vehicle has a system to safely alert the operator if an autonomous technology failure is detected while
the autonomous technology is engaged”).
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this may seem like a glaring oversight, in reality it may not have any
significant ramifications because the “minimal risk condition”
requirement effectively accomplishes a similar result. To legally
operate a fully autonomous vehicle on Georgia roads, the Act
requires the fully autonomous vehicle to satisfy a “minimal risk
condition” in the event of a system failure, whereby the vehicle,
operating without a human driver, “achieves a reasonably safe state,
such as bringing the vehicle to a complete stop . . . .”113 This
independent action is consistent with the fact that the Act does not
require the presence of a licensed human driver,114 but it also begs
the question as to what happens if the minimal risk condition itself
fails when there is not a licensed human driver in the car. “Minimal
risk condition” has an open-ended definition,115 so multiple potential
solutions, such as remote operation, exist in this scenario. Many of
these potential solutions, however, would themselves rely on similar
technology.116
Additionally, some of the early-adopter states have still not fully
embraced widespread AV use.117 California and Nevada, for
example, limit AV use to testing purposes.118 Further, during testing
on public roads, both of these states also require the physical
presence of a licensed driver at all times.119 Florida does not require
the operator’s physical presence, but it does require the operator be a
natural person with a valid driver license.120 While the Act
demonstrates the legislature’s foresight,121 the lack of a testing
limitation or an initial license requirement, even if both expired after

113. O.C.G.A. 40-1-1(27.1) (Supp. 2017).
114. O.C.G.A. 40-5-21(a)(13) (Supp. 2017).
115. See O.C.G.A. 40-1-1(27.1) (Supp. 2017).
116. See, e.g., Vehicle communication and remote system control, U.S. Patent No. 6,028,537, at [57].
117. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(b) (Deering 2012); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.130 (2012).
118. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(b) (Deering 2012); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.130 (2012); see also
AV, NEV. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, http://www.dmvnv.com/autonomous.htm (last visited Sept. 8,
2017) (“Currently, the DMV is accepting applications for testing only. AV are not available to the
general public.”).
119. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(b) (Deering 2012); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.130(2)(A) (2012).
120. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.85, .003(46), .003(50) (LexisNexis 2016).
121. See Transportation Subcommittee Video, supra note 70, at 1 hr., 37 min., 57 sec. (remarks by
Rep. Trey Kelley (R-16th)) (discussing the future of vehicle ownership); id. at 1 hr., 21 min, 22 sec.
(remarks by Sen. Steve Gooch (R-51st)) (“[T]he day may come where our children and grandchildren
will no longer need a driver’s license in Georgia . . . .”).

Published by Reading Room, 2017

17

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 11

248

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1

a short period of time, may be too ambitious given other states’
reticence.122
No Problems with Pronouns
Arguably the most important definition in the Act, determining
“who” is the “operator,” ultimately determines liability in the event
of an accident involving a fully autonomous vehicle.123
Representative Ed Setzler (R-35th) attempted to expel all ambiguity,
making clear that the language defines “who” in terms of ownership,
focusing on a single point of accountability.124 Therefore, in the event
of litigation arising from an accident, determining liability appears,
on its face, fairly straightforward. The operator is whomever
“furnishes the vehicle and makes it available.”125
Some states, like California, include the person seated in the
driver’s seat within the definition of an “operator.”126 However, this
may not be an issue with respect to liability because California
restricts AV use to testing solely by agents of the manufacturer.127
Conversely, in Georgia, if an individually-owned AV gets into an
accident, that individual is the “operator.” This creates an issue in the
event of a technology-related accident, because, as previously
discussed, the Act does not contain a provision requiring AVs to
warn owners in the event of a technological failure.128 In the future,
the Act may need revision if AV technology becomes readily
available to the public. However, as noted by Representative Setzler,
the Act’s focus on single-point accountability does not preclude an
operator from subsequently filing suit against the producer of a

122. Georgia legislators knew about the license requirement in other states and intentionally omitted
such a requirement from the Act. See Setzler Interview, supra note 11 (describing the original Florida
bill as a “non-law” because it still required a driver to be present in the driverless vehicle).
123. O.C.G.A. 40-1-1(38) (Supp. 2017) (“‘Operator’ means any person . . . who causes a fully
autonomous vehicle to move or travel with the automated driving system engaged.”).
124. Transportation Subcommittee Video, supra note 70, at 1 hr., 37 min., 27 sec. (remarks by Rep.
Ed Setzler (R-35th)).
125. Id.
126. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(a)(4) (Deering 2012).
127. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(b)(1) (Deering 2012).
128. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
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specific technological component of the autonomous driving system
when that component’s failure causes the accident.129
Additionally, operators are required to carry liability coverage
equal to 250 percent of the statutory minimum for the first three
years, generally equal to $750,000.130 In Nevada and California,
operators are required to carry liability coverage in the amount of
$5,000,000,131 dwarfing the Act’s requirement. The Act’s insurance
coverage looks even worse in comparison after the three-year period
expires.132 One explanation for this discrepancy rests on the fact that
Nevada and California are taking a more cautious approach to AV
technology.133 The Georgia legislature, on the other hand, has fully
embraced AV technology, and this coverage discrepancy highlights
an area of the Act that should be monitored going forward, especially
once the insurance liability coverage minimums revert to their
original amounts. In the future, the legislature may need to consider
crafting new legislation in the context of fully autonomous vehicle
insurance coverage, rather than basing it on existing limousine and
taxi law.134
One of the legislature’s goals was to create model legislation for
the rest of the country.135 At the conclusion of the 2017 legislative
session, twenty-six states have yet to enact any form of AV
legislation.136 Whether these states draw inspiration from the Act
remains to be seen. The legislature also intended to address AV
safety, liability, and insurance.137 The Act at a minimum addresses all
of these concerns,138 but the efficacy of these provisions similarly
remains unseen. Overall, the Act represents the Georgia legislature’s

129. See Transportation Subcommittee Video, supra note 70, at 1 hr., 39 min., 22 sec. (remarks by
Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)).
130. O.C.G.A. 40-8-11(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 2017).
131. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(b)(3) (Deering 2012); 2017 Nev. Stats. Ch. 608, § 7.7 (amending NEV.
ADMIN. CODE § 482A.060).
132. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11(a)(4)(B)(ii)(B)(i) (Supp. 2017); O.C.G.A. § 40-1-166 (2015).
133. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(b) (Deering 2012); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.130 (2012).
134. Transportation Subcommittee Video, supra note 70, at 1 hr., 21 min., 22 sec. (remarks by Sen.
Steve Gooch (R-51st)) (stating that the Act adopts the insurance coverage and minimums language that
applies to limousines and taxis).
135. Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 15 min., 18 sec.
136. See Self-Driving Legislation, supra note 4.
137. See House Report, supra note 2, at 2; Kelley Interview, supra note 23, at 6 min., 7 sec.
138. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-1, 40-8-11(3)-(4) (Supp. 2017).
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willingness to take its hand off the wheel, but AV technology has a
long road ahead before it realizes its full potential.
W. Perry Hicks & Alan J. Ponce
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